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Introduction
“Where large sums of money are concerned it is advisable to trust nobody”.
Agatha Christie
Since Kydland and Prescott published their famous article on rules versus
discretion defining the time-inconsistency problem of economic policy in 1977, at least
330 economics articles have been published with the words time-inconsistency and/or
credibility in the title. This is truly a voluminous literature and one that is expanding at a
rapid rate. While much of the literature is highly technical and can seem esoteric, there is
generally an underlying practicality to it, especially of the recent literature focusing on
institutional reform. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to survey the literature from
the perspective of a central bank practitioner. We have three speciﬁc objectives. The ﬁrst is
to get a sense of why the credibility problem is important for the economy and for
policymakers. The second is to draw some lessons from the literature that a monetary
authority can use to enhance the credibility of its policy. And the third is to apply some
simple tests of credibility from the literature to assess whether initiatives by the Bank of
Canada to make the conduct of monetary policy more transparent and predictable have
* We’d like to thank2 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
been successful. The paper is divided into three main parts; each devoted to one of these
objectives. There is also a brief concluding section.The credibility of monetary policy: 3
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1. Why is credibility important?
When we talk about the credibility of a policy or institution, we are concerned with
what people expect policy to be in the future and how they think it may change. Before we
can talk about what might or should inﬂuence these beliefs, we need to review a few basic
issues. Section 1.1 reviews how changes (and expected changes) in policy affect the
behaviour of ﬁnancial assets such as exchange rates. Section 1.2 deﬁnes what we mean by
“credibility” and reviews the standard model of how it matters to monetary policy and
macroeconomic welfare.
1.1  Policy Changes and International Financial Markets
To understand how policy change can affect financial markets, such as those for
foreign exchange, we’ll use a simple model of financial market behaviour. A more
thorough review of these questions may be found in Evans (1995).
First, let’s assume that we can measure policy as some variables . To make our
examples as simple as possible, let’s suppose that  is always equal to 0 or 1. For
realism, we might want to think of 0 as meaning that there is no change in policy, while 1
means that policy changes to follow some new rule. We’ll refer to the cases where
 and  as two distinct policy regimes. Changes in  may be hard to
predict, so we’ll treat  as a random variable and use  to represent its realizations.
Another random variable is the financial return on assets held from time  to
, which we’ll call  (and its realizations will be .) The amount that
agents expect to make from holding an asset, like foreign exchange, will depend on the set
of information  that is available to them. This means that the unexpected or excess
portion of returns they receive will be
(1)
where E() is the expectations operator and we’ll assume that  has a mean of zero and is
serially uncorrelated.1
Since policy can affect financial variables such as exchanger rates, it seems
reasonable to allow the state of policy in the next period, , to affect actual returns
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and expected returns.2 Therefore, we can also deﬁne the unexpected or excess return for a
particular regime as
(2)
The difference between  and  is that the latter does not take into account the
possiblity that policy might change. In particular, with some algebra one can show that
(3)
where  is the expected differ-
ence in returns caused by a change in policy. Since  can only take on the values 0 and 1,
 is the probability with which regime 1 was expected and
 is a measure of the degree to which the regime was a “surprise”.
If the probability of observing regime 1 is not very high, one can expect to see long
runs of  in the data. For each of these runs, the excess returns we observe are not
, but . Although  is assumed to have a mean of 0, Equation 3 shows that the mean
of  will generally not be zero. In particular, it will be non-zero so long as neither
 nor . Put another way, so long as the
regime matters to expected returns and the frequency of regimes was not precisely as
expected, the mean of  is non-zero. This problem should only arise in small samples,
since in large samples the law of large numbers will ensure that
1.These assumptions on  are equivalent to assuming that markets are speculatively efﬁcient in the sense of
Fama (1970?). We could easily generalize our analysis to take into account a constant risk premium, or
a time-varying risk premium that is unaffected by changes in policy. The more realistic case where
changing policy regimes affect risk and therefore risk premia is difﬁcult and is only just beginning to be
studied. See Evans (1995) for a review.
2.A simple example of this is the case where the price of the asset  can be expressed as the discounted value
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 (unless agents systematically mispredict the frequency with
which the regimes occur.)
This is an example of what is known as the “peso problem.”3 The peso problem
arises when the expected distribution of  differs in some way from what we observe in
the data; in this case they differ because we restricted our attention to “runs” of the same
regime. As a results, the returns we observe may appear to be abnormally high or low.
This abnormality arises from the fact that we are observing , not . The possiblity of
policy changes therefore tends to create peso problems as marketsallow for the possibility
of changes in policy but these changes may be realized either sooner or later than
expected.
In the above example, it was assumed that agents can immediately tell when policy
changes; they just observe . For example, the policy may be a fixed exchange rate.
Changes in the fixed rate are then public knowledge. However, suppose that the policy is
something which is not announced publically (like the targetted rate of inﬂation or money
growth in some nations.) Instead, agents might have to gradually infer whether a change
has taken place by observing actual inflation or money growth. This is known as a
“learning problem” since agents learn only gradually whether a change in policy has taken
place. This gives rise to a condition very similar to Equation 3
(4)
where  is the probability with which agents thought the regime had not
changed from 0 to 1. As they learn that the regime has changed, this probability
approaches 0 so  approaches .
The learning and the peso problem are similar, but distinct. Peso problems occur
when no change in regime has occured, but one was expected. Learning problems occur
when a change in regime has occured, but agents are uncertain whether this is the case.
The law of large numbers implies that both are small sample problems so long as agents
3.This term was invented by Ken Rogoff in his 1979 doctoral dissertation, in which he examined the
apparently biased forecasts of the forward exchange rate for the Mexican peso prior to a major foreign
exchange crisis (i.e. a regime change.)
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do not make systematic mistakes about the probability of a change in regime. Both may
cause returns to appear unusually high or low.
1.2  Time-Inconsistency -- The Policymaker‘s Problem
In the previous section, we’ve seen how policy changes and the anticipation of
policy changes can matter to ﬁnancial markets. In this section, we’ll discuss how they can
matter to the macroeconomy and to monetary policy. The basic framework we’ll be using
is well known (Barro and Gordon (19??)), so our discussion of it will be kept as simple
as possible.4
Consider the problem faced by private sector agents (A) and a Central Banker (B).
In this stylized example, suppose that B gets to choose the rate of inﬂation  every period,
which for simplicity can be either Hi or Lo. Each period, agents form their expectations of
inflations  by guessing whether B will choose Hi or Lo that period. Both A and B
dislike inflation; other things equal they prefer Lo to Hi. However, both also like high
levels of output .  is in turn determined by the difference between  and . When
 Y is average; when  Y is higher,  and when  Y is lower. We can
summarize this situation with the following Table
In any kind of a steady-state or equilibrium, we’ll assume for the moment that
 to avoid the possiblity that expectations are consistently wrong. This means that
Y will be average in the steady state and that  could be Hi or Lo. Since both parties
dislike inﬂation, the preferred solution is the one where  is Lo. The important question is
whether these two agents are able to ensure that they get to the preferred solution. The
important answer is that they may not. To understand why not, we need to consider the
strategy both sides may adopt.
4.For more rigourous treatments, see ???
Table
Value of Y  is Lo  is Hi
 is Lo Average Lower
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Suppose that the gains to A from having Y higher than normal are outweighed by
other losses whenever . We can think of this as something related to the real losses
incurred when there are pre-determined nominal contracts (for labour or debt) and
inflation is higher than expected, causing the real value of the contract’s payments to be
lower than expected. This means that if A thinks B will choose Hi, then A should choose
Hi. Similarly, A should choose Lo only if it thinks B will choose Lo.
Now suppose that the gains to B from having  Lo are outweighed by having Y
higher than normal (and at normal levels rather than low.) This might simply represent the
weight they attatch to Y, or perhaps a desire to keep real interest rates low. This means that
if  is Lo then B should choose  Hi and if  is Hi then B should also choose  Hi. If
A knows this, they will always choose  Hi to avoid the losses caused when .
Therefore, both sides choose the  steady state, even though the
 steady state makes both better off.
The crux of the problem is that the central bank (B) has an incentive to generate
more inflation than private agents (A) expect, since this tends to improve output for little
cost in inﬂation. Knowing this, agents expect the central bank to be more inﬂationary than
is socially optimal. The optimal thing in such a simple model would be to precommit the
Bank (via a constitutional admendment or some equally irrevocable means) to keep
inﬂation low.5 Agents could then expect a low rate of inﬂation and make the low-inﬂation
steady state feasable.
This shows us that the quality of social outcome the central bank can hope to
achieve will depend in an important way on how private agents expect the central bank to
act in the future, and in particular how they expect it to react to their own actions.
Although the central bank may truthfully express a preference for low inflation, agents
understand that the bank has an incentive to make inflation somewhat higher than
expected. We’ll define “Credibility” to be the extent to which agents believe that policy
makers will carry out their announced plans (or in the absence of explicit announcements,
the extent to which they believe that current policies will continue into the future.) The key
to making the low-inflation steady state attainable in our model is to make B’s policy of
low inflation credible to A. Given the importance of private sector expectations in
5.To be sure, there is a signiﬁcant literature on whether such “deep” structural forms of precommitment are
a worthwhile solution given the possiblity of unforeseen economic shocks.
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determining the range of options available to monetary policymakers in the real world, it
should be no surprise that the existence and sources of crediblity are key elements in
controling inflation. In the next two sections, we’ll survey some of the literature on these
subjects before turning to examine some of the Canadian evidence.The credibility of monetary policy: 9
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2. How can credibility be enhanced?
Once the problem of time-inconsistency was recognized, a literature began to
develope on how policy credibility might be established or enhanced. This literature can
be divided into three main strands. The initial strand focused on how the actions of
policymakers could be revealing for private agents (reputation models). Next a literature
began to develope on instutional reforms supportive of policy credibility. And more
recently, several articles have been written on what might be described as the importance
of policy coherence -- policies that are mutually compatible are more likely to be credible
than policies working in opposing directions. We review these strands of the literature
briefly in this section. [The following sections will be reorganized into the three groups
just mentionned.]
2.1  Announcements (Cheap Talk)
Casual observation suggests that policymakers can sometimes move bond and
exchange rates with mere words.  That is, simply talking about the appropriate level for
interest and exchange rates, even when such talk is not accompanied by any immediate
policy actions, can move these rates.  At first blush, this ability is not surprising -- surely
the Governor of the Bank of Canada must have some private information about his
preferences and surely he is in a position to translate these preferences into policy actions.
This suggests that a central bank could use “cheap talk” to pursue time-inconsistent
policies.  For instance, if cheap talk is effective then there will always be a tendency for a
monetary authority to exaggerate its concern with inflation, and claim that future policy
will be relatively restrictive.  But if wage setters take the monetary authority at its word,
the monetary authority then has an incentive to be less restrictive than it had announced
originally.  This example suggests that it would be very difﬁcult to sustain an equilibrium
where cheap talk is informative and that such an equilibrium is incentive incompatible.
In the real world, however, we sometimes observe announcements by
policymakers moving interest and exchange rate markets.  Given that cheap talk leads to
an incentive incompatible solution, why then do we observe real-world markets reacting to
mere words or cheap talk?  Stein (1989) draws upon the work in Crawford and Sobel
(1982) and argues that when cheap talk is precise it is incentive incompatible but when an
announcement is vague and imprecise it can, in some cases, be incentive compatible.  This10 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
point can be illustrated by considering a modified version of an exchange rate example
given in Stein (1989).  Suppose the Canadian dollar trades currently for 0.80 U.S. dollars
but that the Bank of Canada would prefer a Canadian dollar closer to 0.70 U.S. dollars,
due perhaps to a concern about Canada’s current account balance.  At the same time,
however, suppose domestic economy considerations make the Bank of Canada reluctant to
pursue the expansionary monetary policy that is necessary to depreciate the dollar.
This tension between external and internal policy considerations will lead to a
credibility problem; the Bank now has an incentive to “talk down the dollar” rather than
take explicit action. If the Bank is able to make the public believe that its target for the
Canada/U.S. exchange rate is 0.70 rather than 0.80, then the public would expect a
substantial future easing in monetary policy.  This expectation would lead to an immediate
depreciation of the Canadian dollar which would satisfy the Bank’s exchange rate
objective at no cost.  However, when actual policy is implemented, it will be less
expansive than the public expects due to the Bank’s countervailing concerns with the
domestic economy.  This version of the time-inconsistency problem displays why precise
words cannot credibly communicate information about its future monetary policy.
Instead of a precise target, suppose that the Bank announced a broad range for its
desired Canada/U.S. exchange rate of say 0.75 to 0.65.  In practice, this range may be
characterized with vaguely worded announcements such as “moderate depreciation”
versus “substantial depreciation”.  Stein argues that the ability to communicate only
crudely makes it less attractive for a monetary authority to mislead the public since if it
wishes to mislead the public, the misleading must be done in a big way.  If the Bank
announces substantial depreciation instead of moderate depreciation, the Bank may make
the exchange rate overreact and decline in value more than it would like.  With vague
announcements, the potential for market overreaction serves as a disciplinary device and
restores the incentive compatibility condition.
This example suggests that cheap talk can only be used to communicate certain
types of private information about monetary policy.  As Stein (1989) shows, cheap talk
does not have meaning if a monetary authority always uses it to manipulate expectations
in the same direction.  The cheap talk approach, therefore, would not work if a central
bank wished to communicate private information about its distaste for inflation since the
monetary authority would always want to announce that it is a staunch inflation fighter.The credibility of monetary policy: 11
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The reason cheap talk is effective in the exchange rate example is because the
manipulation of expectations would not always be in the same direction -- that is, the
monetary authority would not always want its currency to depreciate.
2.2  Targets and Target Zones6
A related literature to the cheap talk literature is that of the exchange-rate target-
zone.  In a standard target-zone model, the monetary authority simply announces that it
will allow its currency to float within a given range and that it commits itself to intervene
in the foreign exchange market whenever the target bands are threatened.  These models
allow us to study the behaviour of exchange rates in the presence of an announced
governmental commitment to pursue an easily veriﬁable policy.
The first generation of exchange-rate target-zone models is due to
Krugman (1991).  Krugman developed a model that allows us to study the behaviour of
exchange rates under the assumption of perfect credibility.  From the perspective of
current survey, one interesting implication for exchange-rate dynamics arises from these
models: A credible target zone stabilizes the exchange rate; that is, exogeneous shocks
have a smaller impact on the exchange rate in a target zone than in a free float.  Since
policy actions of both free-float and target-zone monetary authorities are identical when
the exchange rate is within the target range, the stabilization of the exchange rate is
costless to the monetary authority.  This implication is known as the “honeymoon effect”.
The intuition behind the honeymoon effect is as follows.  Since the monetary authority
stands ready to intervene in the foreign exchange market as the exchange rate approaches
a boundary, the likelihood of a policy intervention is also greater.  Therefore, forward-
looking agents will change their expectations of future fundamentals, and accordingly the
spot exchange rate also changes.  In contrast to the free-ﬂoat result, the expected change in
the exchange rate (or expected future fundamentals) is non-zero; this expectation is
captured in the spot price of the foreign exchange instantaneously, and results in the target
boundaries acting as reﬂecting barriers.
Although the standard target-zone model yields interesting insights with respect to
exchange-rate dynamics, the principal predictions of the model have been strongly
6.The discussion in this section draws heavily on a great survey by three cool, good-looking dudes:
Amano, Black and Kasumovich (1996).12 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
rejected by the data.  This has led researchers to question a number of assumptions
associated with the first-generation models.  Most notably, perhaps, is the assumption of
perfect credibility.  Bertola and Caballero (1992) and Bertola and Svensson (1993) argue
that the perfect credibility assumption is inconsistent with the data since we often observe
realignments.  Flood, Mathieson and Rose (1991) and Svensson (1991) provide additional
evidence to support this view.  This has led to the development of second-generation
exchange-rate target-zone models.  Second-generation models have relaxed, inter alia, the
perfect credibility assumption.  These models maintain the same underlying structure of
the standard model  but assume that the announcement is only partially credible.
Bertola and Svensson (1993) extend the basic target-zone model by incorporating
stochastic realignment risk into the model.  In this extended model, stochastic realignment
risk is represented by a stochastic jump in central parity.  In contrast to the standard model,
the forward-looking agent’s expected change in the exchange rate has two components: (i)
the expected change in the exchange rate within the target zone; and (ii) the expected
change in central parity (expected rate of realignment).  The implications for exchange-
rate dynamics in this imperfect credibility setting, unlike the standard model, depend on
the parameterization of the model.  For instance, for some parameterizations, the
announcement of imperfectly credible target bands can actually make the exchange rate
move though the target zone at a faster rate than in the free-float case.  Given the
sensitivity of these models to the choice of parameters, these models shed little light on the
relationship between announcements and credibility.
2.3  Reputation
The term “reputation” is sometimes used interchangeably with “credibility,” but in
this discussion we want to treat them as two distinct ideas. As mentioned above, crediblity
is the extent to which agents believe that policy makers will carry out their announced
plans. For this discussion, reputation rests on agent’s beliefs about the policy maker’s
preferences. Credibility considers whether plans, once announced, are believed.
Reputation asks how the policymaker values different outcomes, independent of what may
have been announced.
Reputation arises in models where agents are uncertain about the goals of policy
(perhaps because they dismiss official announcements as being incredible.) In a simpleThe credibility of monetary policy: 13
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case, we can think of them being unsure whether policy is chosen by someone who
dislikes inﬂation a great deal or dislikes it hardly at all. We’ll call the former kind of policy
maker a “tough” (T) and the latter a “wet” (W).7 Agents believe that policy will be tighter
in the future if the policy maker is T rather than W. Improving the crediblity of policy
therefore requires that the policy maker can convince agents that he is of the type most
consistent with the announced policy. But how do agents form their beliefs about the
policy maker’s type?
These models assume that agents try to infer the type by observing the past actions
of the policy maker - their “track record.” Policy makers who have shown great distaste for
inflation in the past will be judged to be T while others will be judged to be W. These
judgements are usually based on a Bayesian-updating rule which formalizes how agents
learn. Each period agents modify their prior beliefs about the probability that the policy
maker is type T (or W) by considering the relative probabilities that a policy maker of a
given type would have behaved in the observed way.8 Given enough observations, agents
eventually learn the true type of the policy maker. It also allows us to study how and why
reputation varies over time.
Influential papers using this kind of approach include Baxter (1989), Lewis
(1989a,b), and Kaminsky and Peruga (1991). Most of the early work simpliﬁed the model
by assuming that the type of the policy maker would not be subject to future changes (or
that any changes would be permanent.) However, later work by Hamilton (1988), Engel
and Hamilton (1990), Kaminsky (1993), Evans and Lewis (1995) and Ruge-Murcia
(1995) generalized this to allow for the possibility of random infrequent changes in the
policy-maker’s type (from T to W or vice versa.) Most of these papers study the behaviour
7.This follows the terminology used in Masson and Drazen (1994).
8.Speciﬁcally, let  be the probability that a policy maker of the given type could have
generated observation . If  is the probability of T given all observations on  up to t, then
this evolves over time according to the formula
(1)
Such a rule can also be rationalized as the maximum likelihood (conditional on some starting beliefs) estimate
of the true type of the policy maker.
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of either interest rates and/or exchange rates from 1979 through the early 1980s as US
monetary policy changed direction.9
This approach to modeling crediblity has some empirical and theoretical
drawbacks. First, several of the empirical studies mentioned above show that agents
observing monetary aggregates should learn about the change in policy over the space of a
couple of years, but the foreign exchange data show that it took several years more than
that for the change to become credible. Therefore, reputation models suggest that learning
should happen more quickly than it sometimes seems to. One possible explanation is that
by focussing entirely on past information, reputation models omit important forward-
looking behaviour in which agents assume that policy changes happen in a non-random
(or at least partly predictable) manner.
Recent work by Drazen and Masson (1994) and Masson (1995) shows that this
omission can have important implications. If agents view policy changes as exogenous,
then one way to build credibility is to simply persistently pursue the same policy, to
extremes if need be, until agents come to learn and understand it. However, Masson and
Drazen consider models where agents distinguish between the reputation of the
policymaker and the crediblity of the policy. They assume that in the event of adverse
shocks to the economy, policymakers will follow the announced policy until some
threshold level of unemployment is reached and thereafter revert to a looser monetary
policy. The difference between types T and W is that T has a higher threshold
unemployment rate than W . By observing how the policymaker reacts to
shocks, agents gradually learn whether they are type T or W.
Now consider what happens as the economy is hit by a sequence of shocks that rais
e the unemployment rate. As the rate approaches and then surpasses  without a change
in policy, agents become increasingly convinced that the policy maker is type T, which
increases the probability that policy will not switch. However, if unemployment increases
further and now approaches , agents understand that the probability of a change in
policy is increasing even as they become still more convinced that the government’s type
is T. The point is that the relationship between reputation and crediblity may not be
monotonic. If agents believe that a rational policy-maker will change policy at some point,
9.See Ricketts and Rose (199?) for an application to Canadian inﬂation and monetary policy crediblity.
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then conditions which make the type of the policy maker clearer (i.e. enhance reputation)
also bring the change-point closer, possiblity harming credibility.
As a concrete example, consider the recent experience of Sweden from this
perspective.10 When its exchange rate peg came under severe market pressure in August
of 1992, the Sveriges Riksbank tried to defend the krona by raising its overnight lending
rate for bank reserves ﬁrst to 75 and then to 500 per cent. Presumably this clearly signalled
that the policy maker was the type which put a very high value on defending the target.
However, the dramatic rise in interest rates (which did not stay long at the peak level but
remained high) put considerable strain on both macroeconomic activity and the integrity
of the country’s financial sector. Clearly, any rational central bank would be forced to
loosen policy in the face of such problems. As a result, the speculative pressures persisted
and the krona was forced to devalue in November.
2.4  Institutional Reforms 11
Although reputational models are able to generate lower equilibrium inflation
rates, they have a number of unappealing aspects. In particular, there is an inﬁnite number
of punishment strategies, and it is not obvious which one is correct, or how to coordinate
the actions of agents in relatively atomistic labour markets such as those prevailing in
North America to provide an effective deterrent to inflation surprises. As well, the
reputation approach tends to focus on the individual central banker rather than on the
institutional reputation of the central bank. If the inflation bias arises because the
institutional structure provides the wrong incentives to the central banker, however, it
would seem logical to change the institutional structure. This is the focus of the
institutional-design approach which seeks legislative means to alter the central bank’s
objective function.
The institutional-reform literature has three main strands, which not surprisingly
are often inter-related, focussing on: rules for monetary policy, performance contracts for
central bankers and central bank independence12.
10.Masson (1995) and Drazen and Masson (1994) use this model to explain the departure of the UK from the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992. Ireland’s experience at the time was similar to that
of Sweden, with the central bank raising interest rates to 300% in a failing attempt to defend the punt.
11.For good surveys of this literature, see the introduction to Persson and Tabellini (1994), Debelle and
Fischer (1995), and Waller (1996).16 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
Rules for monetary policy
Requiring the monetary authority to follow a binding rule is perhaps the most
straightforward legislative restriction addressing the dynamic-inconsistency problem. If
policymakers cannot depart from their announced policy, there is no barrier to pursuing
low-inﬂation.
While this clearly would be beneficial, several authors (Canzoneri (1985),
Lohmann (1992), and Garfinkel and Oh (1993)) have argued that such rules come with a
cost -- they impose a trade-off between reducing inflation and stabilizing output.
McCallum (1995) argues, however, that there need not be a trade-off between flexibility
and commitment. Central banks can both act sensibly and avoid exploiting the
expectations of the private sector -- it simply requires the correct policy rule and the
appropriate institutional set-up.
Performance Contracts
The intuition of performance contracts for central bankers is also straightforward.
Central bankers, like everyone else, respond to financial incentives. Therefore, by tying
the ﬁnancial rewards of central bankers -- either their salary or the bank’s budget -- to the
performance of macroeconomic aggregates that society cares about, social welfare can be
maximized. The only requirement of a performance contract is that it makes the central
bank pay more attention to inflation than society does13. Because the inflation bias is
constant and independent of the output shock, a simple linear penality will deter the
central bank from inﬂating without causing it to forsake its stabilization responsibilities.
McCallum (1995) argues that the inﬂation bias is not the result of a principal-agent
problem in the classic sense, and therefore a performance contract might not be credible or
effective. The existence of a rogue central banker seeking to raise output above trend
against society’s wishes seems a bit remote, it is more likely that there are elected ofﬁcials
that would like to do so and exert pressure on the central bank. If that is the case, it is not
certain that the performance contract would actually be enforced. Nevertheless, it seems
12.More recently there has been literature on designing institutions to cope with ignorance, see for example,
Romer and Romer (1996). They argue that limited knowledge about how the economy operates and the
effects of policy have been a much more pervasive obstacle to good policy than the time-inconsistency
problem.
13.Instituting a performance contract is equivalent to appointing a “conservative” central banker (Rogoff
(1985)).The credibility of monetary policy: 17
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plausible that by making the goals of the monetary authorities more transparent and
requiring public accountability at specified intervals of time, performance contracts can
lead to better policy actions14.
Central Bank Independence
It is possible that the source of the inflation bias is pressure exerted on the central
bank by elected officials. If the incentives of politicians diverge from those of the general
public, society’s interest would be served by granting the central bank independence15. An
autonomous central bank is more likely to pursue low inﬂation and stabilize output as the
general public wishes.
Finally, in closing this subsection it is worth noting that these solutions are not
mutually exclusive. Indeed they are probably mutually reinforcing16. Also, while a perfect
commitent technology or institutional design may not exist, it is possible to raise the costs
of reneging on promises significantly, thereby rendering monetary policy more credible.
The basic goal of the institutional-design literature is to make it costly to renege on a good
policy. The costs can take the form of monetary penalties, loss of prestige, or removal of
policymakers from their positions.
[The above subsection will be reworked to build to the conclusion that while there
are “good” things to do, there is no magic bullet.]
2.5  Debt as an Incentive
The previous section showed that by treating government policy as a conscious
choice by a rational policy maker, we are lead to conclusions different from those
produced by the assumption that policy is exogenous. This leads naturally once more into
the question of how credibility behaves if agents think policymakers are rational. We’ve
looked at some aspects of this question previously -- rationality was central to the
discussion of dynamic inconsistency and cheap talk. In this section, we’ll focus on another
14.As well, individuals or groups seeking to exert pressure on the central bank would be brought into the
spotlight which might deter such behaviour.
15.Characteristics of central banks such as their legal independence, the average tenure of their governors,
and the objectives in their charters are highly correlated with average inﬂation rates (see, for example,
Alesina 1988, Grilli,Masciandro, and Tabellini 1991 and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992).
16.See Walsh (1995b) on New Zealand.18 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
aspect of this literature; the interaction of rationality, debt structure (or debt management)
and credibility.
By the structure of the debt or debt management, we mean the terms under
which the government sells its debt. There are three variables; maturity refers to how
frequently the debt must be refinanced (and therefore repriced), index refers to whether
the amount the government promises to pay at maturity is fixed or is linked to some
other index (such as the price of oil or the rate of inflation), and currency refers to the
currency in which the amount to be paid is donominated (i.e. foreign or domestic.)
Most of the papers in this literature start by assuming that there is a single
policy maker in charge of deciding both fiscal and monetary policy, or more accurately,
that the monetary policy authority cares (among other things) about the government’s
fiscal position. Rationales for this differ. This could be because financial markets are
imperfect and therefore social welfare may be enhanced by limiting the volitility of the
government’s debt. This may reflect the central bank’s susceptabilty to political
pressure from the Treasury. Certainly many industrial-country central banks are less
then fully independent in this sense; witness the major monetary policy
announcements that are made jointly by the Governor of the Central Bank and the
Minister of Finance (or equivalent.) Alternatively, even were the central bank to be
fully insulated from political pressure, at some point a government financial crisis
undermines the stability of the domestic financial sector. Therefore even a fully
independent bank which was mindful of its responsiblity to ensure the integrity of the
financial system must at some point take government fiscal affairs into account. The
point is that if agents know that the monetary policy maker cares about the
government’s fiscal position, then that policy maker’s credibility will depend in part on
how his or her actions affect the ﬁscal position.
Older analyses of how debt structure matters to monetary policy credibility
focussed on the possiblity that the central bank might monetize the government’s debts.17
Monetization refers to the monetary policy authority’s ability to reduce ex post the real
value that government debtholders receive when the debt matures. This occurs by
contracting debt with a fixed nominal value at maturity and then creating higher than
expected inflation.18 Structuring the debt in a way that limits its monetization enhances
the credibility of monetary policy in models where the monetary policy maker isThe credibility of monetary policy: 19
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concerned about the government’s fiscal position. Limiting the potential extent of
monetization can be done in a number of ways, such as issuing short-term rather than
long-term debt, inflation-indexed (real interest rate) debt instead of nominal debt, or
foreign rather domestic currency denominated debt. In this framework, since each of these
choices has the same effect on the potential for monetizing the debt, it makes no difference
which of them (or which combination of them) is chosen. Missale and Blanchard (1994)
argue that once government debts become large enough to make repudiation a concern,
further increases in government debt force a reduction in the effective maturity of the debt.
In this way governments can maintain the crediblity of their pledge not to repudiate, and
thereby ﬁnance their debts at more reasonable costs.
Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987) argued that by exploiting the effects of
debt structure, the policymaker should not only improve the credibility of monetary
policy but he should even be able to overcome the basic dynamic inconsistency problem
mentioned at the outset of this chapter and achieve the same welfare outcome as if he had
been able to perfectly precommit. In their model, the marginal fiscal benefit to the
government of creating unexpected inflation is proportional to the outstanding stock of
money plus the market-value of the government’s outstanding long-term nominal debt. So
long as this sum is positive, the dynamic inconsistency problem exists. The optimal course
of action for the government is then to become a net buyer of long-term debt (i.e. make its
outstanding stock of such debt negative) and a net seller of short-term debt, thereby taking
a large speculative position in the bond market. When this speculative position is precisely
equal to the size of the outstanding monetary base, then any ﬁscal gains to the government
from the effect of surprise inﬂation on the monetary base are precisely offset by its effects
17.One question consistently ignored in this literature is the extent to which the government’s debt exposure
matches the structure of its debts. For example, we know that Canadian provincial governments issue
widely differing amounts of foreign-currency denominated debt, but that much of this debt may
subsequently be swapped back into Canadian dollars. Therefore their remaining foreign currency
exposure is not directly observable. If the federal government can use similar methods to hide the
effective structure of its debt, then debt structure issues should be irrelevant to credibility. For the sake of
discussion, we will assume that the government is sufﬁciently large relative to the rest of the rest of the
market that it is unable to conceal its effective debt structure.
18.Instead of just monetization, some authors talk more generally about (partial) debt repudiation, which can
happen via monetarization, taxation of interest payments, or direct repudiation.20 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
on the government’s debt portfolio.19 This gives the government no incentive to create
surprise inﬂation and therefore resolves the dynamic inconsistency problem.
Unfortunately, this solution is probably more of a theoretic feature than a policy
prescription since several features may be unfeasible in practise. Persson, Persson and
Svensson note explicitly that this argument fails to carry through in the case of a small
open economy where the government influence over real and nominal interest rates may
be limited by the effects of foreign shocks. Bohn (1991) notes that the time inconsistency
problem in open economies can be created just by the existence of nominal private debt
held by foreigners. The analysis also fails to consider the degree to which the government
would expose itself to liquidity risk by constantly refinancing not only itself but also a
large amount of private debt on a short-term basis.20
So far we have only discussed how the ability to monetize government debts
may affect the credibility of monetary policy. A more recent strand of the literature
focusses on what some (such as Missale (1995)) describe as the insurance aspect of
monetary-fiscal policy interaction, but which will here be refered to as consistency of
monetary and fiscal goals. These models can lead to quite different views on the
appropriate structure of the debt.
Suppose the Chancellor of the Exchequer stakes his reputation on achieving a
set of short-term deficit-reduction targets. The models in this literature predict that,
other things equal, such an announcement makes any inflation-control policy less
credible. Why? Assume that tighter monetary policy has the short-term effect of
lowering the level of economic activity and raising real interest rates. This means that
government tax receipts will be lower, entitlement payments higher and interest
payments on existing debt higher.21 All of these serve to increase the deficit in the short
run. Exactly the same reasons would lead us to expect that looser monetary policy will
19.Persson, Persson and Svensson credit Robert King for ﬁrst suggesting this in a seminar at Rochester. Their
analysis also examines how manipulation of the maturity structure of indexed debt can make the
government’s intertemporal taxation problem dynamically consistent.
20.For example, see the articles by Alesina, Prati and Tabellini and by Giavazzi and Pagano in the conference
volume by Dornbusch and Draghi (1990).
21.It will also lower seigneurage revenue if the central bank is on the efﬁcient side of the seigneurage Laffer
curve. However, seigneurage is typically a minor contribution to government revenues in the contexts we
are considering.The credibility of monetary policy: 21
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lower the deficit in the short run. If we think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer can
influence (however indirectly) the Governor of the Central Bank, then the chancellor’s
announcement must make us expect at least somewhat looser monetary policy on average
in the future.
To understand what this implies for debt-management policy, recall that the
monetization models could treat short-term, inflation-indexed or foreign-currency debt
as equivalent; all three protect the investor from suprise domestic inflation and therefore
had equivalent implications for monetary policy credibility. In consistency models, these
three debt-structure variables have different effects on monetary policy crediblity. To see
this, consider the effects of a monetary policy shock. This will affect short-term nominal
interest rates more than long-term nominal interest rates. Therefore, lowering the average
maturity of the debt increases the sensitivity of debt finance costs (and therefore the
budget deficit) to monetary policy. Now suppose that instead of lowering the maturity of
the debt, we had instead issued debt in foreign rather than domestic currency. A monetary
tightening presumably causes an appreciation of the domestic currency and thereby lower
debt-service costs, while a loosening should depreciate the currency and thereby raise
debt-service costs. This means the cost of servicing the debt will tend to offset the other
cyclical effects of monetary policy on the deﬁct, so the government’s ﬁscal position is now
less sensitive to the stance of monetary policy. Finally, suppose that inflation-indexed
long-term debt had been issued instead of nominal long-term debt. Assuming that
monetary policy shifts have no effect on long-term real interest rates but move long-term
inﬂation expectations (and therefore nominal long-term interest rates via the Fisher effect)
countercyclically, issuing the indexed rather than nominal long-term debt makes the
government’s fiscal position more sensitive to the stance of monetary policy. Therefore
issuing more foreign currency debt should make monetary policy more credible while
issuing more short-term or inflation-indexed debt should make monetary policy less
credible.
In summary, if the public believes (1) that montary policy will be influenced at
the margin by government budgetary concerns, and (2) that shifts in monetary policy
are determined rationally, then the structure of the government debt will influence
monetary policy credibility. On the one hand, the temptation to monetize part of the
debt means that short-term or inflation-indexed or foreign-currency debt make tight22 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
monetary policy more credible when debt burdens are significant. On the other hand,
the temptation to relax monetary policy to improve the fiscal position (i.e. the “Fortin
effect”) means that short-term or inflation-indexed debt make tight monetary policy
less credible while foreign-currency debt has the opposite effect.
2.6  Self-Fulﬁlling Beliefs
All of the models of crediblity that have been discussed to this point show how
the policymakers’ crediblity is determined by their announcements, their reputation, the
incentives they face, or other factors. Since these determinants of crediblity are under the
control of the monetary or fiscal policymakers, one could hope that these models might
help make policy actions more credible and produce better policy outcomes. However,
another strand of the literature presents models in which policymakers have much less
control over their crediblity. In particular, for a given set of circumstances
(announcements, track record, incentives) there may be multiple equilibrium levels of
credibility. Policy actions in these models are credible only if the market believes them to
be credible, because market beliefs can be self-fulﬁlling.22
The importance of this problem was first emphasised by Calvo (1988), who
presented a model where the benevolent policymaker much choose the optimal rate of
inflation. Although inflation reduces welfare in this model, it also monetizes the
government’s nominal debt and is therefore a less-distortionary source of taxation than
conventional taxes. Consequently, the policymaker chooses to create inflation only if the
tax burden becomes too high.
Government debt in this model is held by rational bondholders who understand
the government’s policy problem and who require a fixed expected real rate of return
on their investments. This creates a strategic complementarity that makes multiple
equilbria possible. These multiple equilbria can be unambiguously ranked, with welfare
decreasing as equilibrium inﬂation rises.
22.The intuition is esseantially the same as that which is found in the Diamond-Dybvig model of banking
panics. If depositors are conﬁdent that the banks will not fail, they will not withdraw deposits from
the banking system and therefore banks will not fail. However, if they lack such conﬁdence, they will
attempt to withdraw their deposits and thereby cause the banking system to collapse.The credibility of monetary policy: 23
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In the low-inflation equilibrium, bondholders expect no inflation and therefore
demand low nominal interest rates. The low nominal interest rates keep the tax burden
manageable and therefore the policymaker does not restort to inflation finance. Since
bondholders’ inﬂation expectations turn out to be correct, this is an equilibrium.
In the high-inflation equilibrim, bondholders expect significant inflation and
therefore demand high nominal interest rates. The high nominal interest rates greatly
increase the tax burden and therefore the policymaker restorts to inflation finance.
Since bondholders’ inflation expectations turn out to be correct, this is also an
equilibrium.
The key point is that both the high and the no inflation equilibrium are possible
equilibria for the same set of economic fundamentals (e.g. debt, tax and inflation costs,
real interest rates, etc.) The equilibrium which is choosen depends on bondholders’
expectations, which will be self-fulﬁlling.
In the particular example discussed above, the government might be able to
restructure its debt so as to eliminate the possiblity of multiple equilibria. For example, by
issuing long-term rather than short-term debt, its interest payments (and therefore its
ﬁnancing requirements) will be less subject to changes in bondholder conﬁdence, reducing
the scope for self-fulfilling expectations. On the other hand, Obstfeld (1994, 1995) notes
that similar multiple equilibria problems can arise in models without any government debt
but where the central bank cares about inﬂation and unemployment, or the fragility of the
ﬁnancial sector, or the distribution of income, or the effects on real interest rates.
To be sure, the empirical relevance of mutliple equilibria to explaining
crediblity is uncertain. The subject is most commonly scrutinized and debated in the
context of defending an exchange-rate target, particularly in the context of either a
program of disinflation, or the European Exchange Rate Machanism (ERM) or the most
recent collapse of the Mexican peso. Some, such as Eichengreen, Rose and Wyploz
(1996)) note the potential importance of this kind of explanation, while others such as
Bordo and ?? (1996), argue that fundamental factors are sufficient to account for
exchange-rate crises.23
23.See also Krugman (1996).24 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
3. Is Canadian monetary policy credible?
Recently, Canada has implemented many of the sorts of institutional reforms
discussed in the previous section in an effort to make monetary policy more
understandable, more predictable and more credible. These measures are discussed in
some detail in section ...., but they include an explicit target for inﬂation and initiatives to
render policy actions more transparent. In this part of the paper, we conduct several simple
tests of the credibility of recent Canadian monetary policy in an effort to shed some light
on whether these institutional changes have proven helpful.
This part of the paper is organized in three main sections. The ﬁrst section is a brief
overview of monetary policy and macroeconomic developments in Canada and the United
States, during the current period of floating exchange rates, since June 1970. The United
States is included because our focus is the credibility of monetary policy as exhibited by
the behaviour of the exchange rate and international interest rate differentials, and
monetary policy in the United States has important implications for these variables. The
next section uses an atheoretical econometric technique to filter the data to see if there is
reason to think that there has been at least one change in the monetary policy regime in
Canada to be investigated. To anticipate the results, the data suggest that there was a
change in the monetary policy regime in Canada relative to the United States beginning in
the second half of the 1980s. The third section investigates whether the increased
emphasis on low inflation in Canadian monetary policy has been recognized by and is
credible to ﬁnancial markets.
4. The Monetary Policy Background
4.1  The United States24
In broad terms, the conduct of monetary policy in the United States since the early
1970s can be divided into three regimes, at least in terms of operating targets, if not
underlying inflation objectives. During the first regime from approximately 1970 to 1979
the federal funds rate was the primary instrument of monetary policy and arguably served
as the target of policy as well. During this period, the funds rate was maintained within a
24.This description of U.S. developments draws in particular on Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) and Mussa
(1994).The credibility of monetary policy: 25
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narrow target band, of roughly 50-75 basis points, which was adjusted smoothly in
response to macroeconomic developments. Officially, the Federal Reserve was concerned
about monetary aggregates, announcing targets for money growth beginning in 1975. In
retrospect, however, it appears that the Federal Reserve cared more about trying to reduce
the unemployment rate than the rate of growth of the monetary aggregates. M1 growth
accelerated after 1975 despite announced reductions of the target ranges. The
unemployment rate declined steadily from 1975 to 1978 period and inflation pressures
were evident even before the second oil price shock.
The first fed funds targeting regime ended on 6 October 1979 with the
announcement by Fed Chairman Paul Volcker of a committment to reduce inflation by a
change in Fed operating procedures to targeting non-borrowed bank reserves. The new
operating procedure did not of necessity require a change in the conduct of monetary
policy, except perhaps for a willingness to tolerate greater volatity in interest rates at very
high frequencies25. However, it seems to have been accompanied by a decision by the Fed
to place greater weight on monetary targets in order to reduce inﬂation26. The new policy
focus achieved its disinﬂationary goals, but contributed to a deep recession in 1981-82.
In the autumn of 1982 the Fed changed tactics again, adopting a borrowed reserves
operating procedure. This third regime can be characterized as a de facto return to interest
rate smoothing, owing to a tight link between desired borrowed reserves and the federal
funds rate. With an important difference from the earlier period, however, during the most
recent period, the Federal Reserve has maintained a clearer focus on controlling inflation
and has endeavoured to take early action to prevent inflation from accelerating. For
example, between early 1987 and the middle of 1989 the Fed implemented a series of
tightening moves in an effort to slow the pace of demand growth and offset emerging
inflation pressures. And in the main the Fed has been successful with inflation remaining
comparatively low and stable in the latter part of the 1980s and the early 1990s27.
25.Cook (1989) argues that the introduction of the nonborrowed reserve procedure was a smokescreen, with
nonborrowed reserves targets being adjusted to produce the high interest rates considered necessary to
bring down inﬂation.
26.Fed reaction functions estimated by McNees (1986) and by Karamouzis and Lombra (1989) show that the
Fed placed a greater weight on deviations of the money supply from target during 1979-82, relative to
earlier and later periods.26 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
4.2  Canada
[This subsection will be redrafted to make the similarities and differences with the
U.S. more explicit.
On Monday 1 June 1970 Canada returned to a floating exchange rate in order to
break the link with mounting inflation pressures in the United States and to cope with a
significant improvement in the terms of trade and strong capital inflows. For the first half
of the ensuing decade, nominal monetary conditions were used as a guide to policy
decisions and, in retrospect, the Bank of Canada proved unwilling to countenace the
signiﬁcant increases in interest rates and/or exchange rates that would have been necessary
to maintain low inflation. As a result, inflation pressures accumulated in Canada, as in
other industrial countries, leading to a change in monetary policy startegy in the mid-
1970s.
On 6 November 1975, the Governor of the Bank of Canada announced a policy of
targeting the narrow monetary aggregate M1, with the objective of gradually reducing
inﬂation. While the Bank was successful in achieving a series of successively lower target
growth rates for M1 in the latter half of the decade, the underlying objective for inflation
was not met, owing to instability in the relationship between the growth of M1 and
inﬂation28. Indeed, after some initial improvement inﬂationary pressures began to increase
during this period. By 1981, the rate of increase in both the CPI and the Implict GDP
deﬂator was higher than at the start of the program of monetary gradualism.
Recognizing this problem, in the early 1980s the Bank of Canada moved to a more
eclectic approach to implementing monetary policy, still with the objective of gradually
reducing inflation29. At this time, the Bank de-emphasized the monetary aggregates and
took into account a wide array of information -- both real and financial indicators of
economic activity -- when implementing monetary policy30. This was a period when both
short- and long-term interest rates in the United States reached unusually high levels and
27.Indeed, Dueker and Fisher (1996) suggest that U.S. monetary policy can be characterized as pursuing a 4
to 6 percent target range for the inﬂation rate from 1971 until 1991, when the target inﬂation range was
lowered to 2 to 3 percent.
28.See Freedman (1989) and Thiessen (1992).
29.Howitt (1993) suggests that the press release of 3 April 1978, citing currency depreciation rather than
monetary growth as the reason for the announced increase in the Bank Rate, as a key turning point.
30.Targets for monetary aggregates were formally abandoned in November 1982.The credibility of monetary policy: 27
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were very volatile (Chart ). Because macroeconomic conditions and, in particular,
inflation pressures were broadly similar to those in the United States, Canadian interest
rates followed a similar course, although the movements were somewhat smoother31.
During this period the Bank of Canada was successful in reducing the rate of increase in
the CPI from 12.4 per cent in 1981 to 4.0 per cent in 1985.
However, with inﬂation stalled in the 4 to 4 1/2 per cent range, the Bank of Canada
increasingly began to focus the explanation of policy on the goal of attaining price
stability. In January 1988, Governor John Crow signalled this direction for monetary
policy in the Hansen Lecture. 32 This was the clearest, most unequivocal statement to date
of the Bank’s objective. Following this pronouncement, the Bank of Canada allowed
interest rates and exchange rates to fluctuate more widely than in the past. From 1987
through 1989, when the Canadian economy was growing more rapidly than the American
economy, domestic interest rates rose substantially and the Canadian dollar appreciated
significantly. In the spring of 1990, as the speculative bubble in housing burst and the
demand-dampening effects of previous monetary tightening were felt, the Canadian
economy entered a recession which lasted until the spring of 1991. Owing to the serious
economic distortions that had built up during the period of excess demand and the
uncertainty arising from world events the recession was relatively severe by historical
standards. By early 1991 the economy was in a position of substantial excess supply.
In February of 1991 the Governor of the Bank of Canada and the Minister of
Finance jointly announced a target path for the reduction of inﬂation. The targets speciﬁed
reducing the year-over-year rate of increase in the CPI to 3 per cent by the end of 1992, 2
1/2 per cent by mid-1994 and 2 per cent by the end of 1995. In December 1993, a further
set of inflation-control targets was jointly announced by the Bank and the government,
which extended the band of 1 to 3% through 1998. This is to be followed by a movement
to price stability, to be deﬁned operationally by 1998. After undershooting the target band
31.For a discussion of the problems that movements in U.S. interest rates can pose for monetary policy in a
small open economy such as Canada, see Freedman (1983).
32.In fact the desirability of returning to price stability has long been recognized by Canadian monetary
authorities, but the goal of price stability only had operational signiﬁcance for policy beginning in the
late 1980s. See J. Crow and P. Duguay and S. Poloz28 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
in 1992, the core rate of inflation has been consistently in the lower part of the inflation-
control band since.
The Bank of Canada has also undertaken a number of steps in addition to the
inflation control targets to inject greater transparency into actions. In mid-1994, the Bank
of Canada introduced greater transparency in its operations by becoming more explicit
about the near-term range for the one-day interest rate. Since that time there has been a
target range of fifty basis points for the one-day rate which is signalled to the market by
the Bank’s interventions in the overnight market, and recently the Bank has begun to issue
a press release providing the rationale for any change in the range. This greater
transparency is intended to reduce the uncertainty about the Bank of Canada’s intentions
which can interfere with the transmission of monetary plicy actions to interest rates further
out along the yield curve and to the exchange rate.
As well, the Bank of Canada has taken a number of steps to reduce uncertanity
about monetary policy by providing more public information on monetary policy
operations and the interpretation of economic and financial developments. Since 1987,
excerpts of the brieﬁng on monetary policy provided to the directors of the Bank at regular
board meetings have been published. Since early 1993, a discussion of monetary policy
has been included each quarter in the Bank of Canada Review. And in May 1995, the Bank
began publishing a more detailed account of inflation developments and the conduct of
monetary policy in a semi-annual Monetary Policy Report.
5. Has There Been a Change in the Monetary Policy Regime?
The objective of this sub-section is to determine whether there has been one or
more changes in the monetary policy regime in Canada to be studied. Has the policy
reaction function or feedback rule of the Bank of Canada changed through time? Since we
are interested in the policy reaction function, we need a technique that can suggest
whether one variable might be reacting to another. Granger causality, which is a measure
of the significance of one variable in forecasting another, is well suited to this purpose; it
was designed to test whether one event statistically preceeds another.33 Following
33.Granger causality can also be used to search for forward looking behaviour on part of monetary authorities,
see Hamilton (1994) chapter 11, and for an application see Alameida and Goodhart (1996).The credibility of monetary policy: 29
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standard prtactice, we embed the test for Granger causality within a VAR, which enables
us to take account of the interactions among key macroeconomic and policy variables
without imposing a lot of a priori restrictions on the data.
The VAR estimated to search for changes in monetary policy behaviour in Canada
includes the kind of variables that would enter a reaction function or a policy feedback
rule of the type advocated prominently by Taylor (1993) and McCallum (1987,1989),
among others. The VAR has three variables: 1) The differential between the overnight
interest rate in Canada and the federal funds rate in the United States. -- this variable
indicates the monetary policy decisions being taken in Canada, given the stance of
monetary policy in the United States. The overnight interest rate is often thought of as the
policy instrument of the central bank because it is directly impacted by the central bank’s
decisions on settlement balances. Armour et al find that the overnight rate is a good
indicator of the stance of monetary policy in Canada over the period since the 1950s;
while Taylor (1993) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , among others, have argued that the
federal funds rate is the best single measure of monetary policy in the United States.; 2)
The CPI excluding food and energy -- this variable is a good measure of the underlying
inﬂation pressures that are of concern to a central bank. Indeed, when the Bank of Canada
announced its inflation-reduction targets for the total CPI it also declared an operational
target for the CPI ex food, energy and indirect taxes, noting that ... (give reason from
announcement of targets , something like: to avoid sharp changes in monetaring of
monetary instruments as a result of transitory shocks to these variables) While there have
been episodes when sharp increases in food and/or energy prices have contributed
signiﬁcantly to an overall increase in the CPI, through time, food and energy price shocks
have been largely self-correcting, and since 1970 these prices have increased on average
by about the same amount as other prices; 3) the unemployment gap -- which is a
summary measure of cyclical movements in the real economy (the gap estimate is
provided by Dupasquier et al, this conference)34.
Because we are interested in changes in behaviour, we estimate a series of VARs
using OLS and rolling ﬁve-year sample periods covering the period from ..... 1975 to April
1996. As a check on the robustness of the results, we also estimate for 10-year sample
34.Owing to the problems associated with generated regressors, we also estimated the VARs with the change
in the actual unemployment rate instead of the gap and the results were virtually identical.30 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
periods. The lag length of the VARs is chosen with the widely used Schwarz criteria and
the Hannan-Quinn criteria. The results are relatively invariant to lag lengths between one
and three.35
The statistic used to infer non-causality (and therefore causality) is the likelihood
ratio statistic, that is :
[expression]
where L( ) and L( ) are the log-likelihood function evaluated respectively at the
non-constrained and the constrained value of the estimator. For a VAR ( ) written:
[expression]
where... is a standard white noise process, the null hyporthesis:
[expression]
can be seen as equivalent to:
[expression]
Even though the more commonly used Wald Statistic is asymptotically equivalent,
we have chosen the likelihood ratio statistic because it is more powerful in small samples,
especially when applied to non-causality tests (see Guilket-Salemi (1982)). In order to
have comparable results for the different likelihood ratio statistics, we perform all of the
rolling regressions with VARs of order three.
Chart ? depicts the evolution of the likelihood ratio statistics (for a null hypothesis
of no causality) for the Granger causality tests of inflation on the differential between
overnight interest rates in Canada and the United States from the 5-year and 10-year
rolling VARs. The results from the two sample sizes are very similar. They suggest a
change in the monetary policy regime in Canada relative to the United States in the period
from 1988 to 1992 (based on the 5-year sample) , with the Bank of Canada placing greater
emphasis on inflation after that time than it had previously. Prior to the latter half of the
1980s the likelihood ratio statistics are insignificant, after that time they are consistently
signiﬁcant. This ﬁve year period encompasses both the Hansen Lecture in which Governor
35.Of these three series, the only potential problem with regard to non-stationarity is the inﬂation rate. A
number of studies have concluded that the inﬂation rate is stationary, however, Dupasquier et al (this
conference) using simulations to ﬁnd the correct critical values for the test statistics conclude that the
inﬂation rate in Canada is not stationary. To take account of this possible problem, we estimate the Var
in two forms; one with the inﬂation rate and the other with the ﬁrst difference of the inﬂation rate. The
results are essentially the same which is consistent with a theorem of Haugh and Pierce (1977).The credibility of monetary policy: 31
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Crow stressed the goal of price stability and the introduction of the inflation-control
targets.
6. Testing for Credibility
Given that there is reason to think, both a priori and empirically, that the Bank of
Canada changed its inﬂation objective in the second half of the 1980s or early 1990s, how
can we test the reponse of the exchange rate and international interest rate differentials to
the change in regime? In deciding on an approach, two factors must be borne in mind.
First, there is only a single change in the monetary policy regime in Canada relative to the
United States, therefore an approach that is parsimonious with the data is required.
Second, floating exchange rates are notoriously difficult to model, and interest rate
differentials are not much easier to explain36. Taking these factors into account, we have
opted for a “news” approach for testing the credibility of the change in monetary policy
regime in Canada.
The news approach is based on the asset market view of exchange rate
determination. An important implication of the asset view of exchange rate determination
-- as developed by Dornbush (1976), Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976), among others -- is
that the market for foreign exchange is efficient. In an ‘efficient’ market, prices reflect all
available information, including the economic model relevant for their determination. This
means that the spot exchange rate reﬂects the expectations of market participants about all
of the future values of the determinants of the exchange rate. Consequently, when new
information arrives that leads market participants to revise their expectations, the
exchange rate will change. The response of the exchange rate to certain types of news can
shed light on the market’s expectations of future policy, and hence policy credibility. The
news approach also has the advantage that it can be implemented using simple OLS
regressions that are very parsimionious with the data.
Since the behaviour of the Bank of Canada appears to have changed in the late
1980s and early 1990s, it would be interesting to examine the market response to inﬂation
data before and after the mid-1980s. Unfortuneately, the market surveys going back in
time needed for such a study are not available. Money Market Services International (the
36.On the former, see Meese and Rogoff (197..) and the body of literature they spawned.32 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
source of expectations data used in many studies of announcement effects in the United
States) only began surveying participants in Canadian financial markets in January 1992
Therefore we are going to concentrate our efforts in the sample period from January 1992
to April 1996. Fortunately, this period largely coincides with the introduction of inflation
reduction and control targets in Canada, so we can test whether current monetary policy is
credible. However, to try to get some handle on whether market participants perceived
Canadian monetary policy differently after the mid-1980s than they did before, we will
use a VAR to generate inflation forecasts over a longer period of time and use these
forecasts as the basis of an event study
6.1  The Methodology and the Tests
6.1.1  The Methodology
To evaluate the impact of the announcements, we estimate OLS regressions of the
following basic form,
[equation]
where y is the change in the price of the asset being used to gauge credibility, x is
the CPI surprise and u is a random error term.
6.1.2  The Tests
Using this regression approach, we conduct two tests of the credibility of recent
Canadian monetary policy; one based on the response of the exchange rate to inflation
surprises, and the other based on the response of longer-term international interest rate
differentials to inﬂation surprises.
Test1: a simple OLS regression of the change in the exchange rate surrounding the
time of the CPI announcement against the inﬂation surprise (controlling for other sources
of news). If the estimated parameter is positive, indicating an appreciation of the currency
when inﬂation is higher than expected, monetary policy is credible.
Test2: simple OLS regressions of the change in the international interest rate
differential at 5- and 10-year maturites on the day of the CPI announcement against the
inﬂation surprise. If the estimated parameter is zero, monetary policy is credible. 37
The intuition underlying these tests is straightforward. With regard to the
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that the market expects the central bank to tighten monetary conditions to keep inﬂation in
line with its objective -- the policy is credible38. If the central bank were not expected to
resist the increase in inflationary pressure, the exchange rate would depreciate. With
regard to the interest-rate-differential test, a zero response of longer-term differentials is
consistent only with monetary policy credibility. If the central bank is expected to achieve
its inﬂation target with consistencey though time, an inﬂation surprise in any given month
will not alter long-term interest rates, the estimated parameter will not be statistically
significantly different from zero. If monetary policy is not credible, longer-term interest
rate differentials could be expected to widen in response to a positive inflation surprise,
owing to the Fisher effect. For completeness, long-term interest differentials might also
widen in response to higher-than-expected inflation even if monetary policy is credible;
provided that markets think that inflationary pressures are such that tighter monetary
conditions will be required for a considerable period of time and incorporate this
expectation along the yield curve.
6.2  The Data and Empirical Results
6.2.1  The Data
The Canadian CPI is usually published during the third week of the month,
typically a few days after the U.S. CPI is published. And it is comparatively rare that other
significant data are published on the same day (this will be discussed further later). The
CPI data are released at 7:00 a.m. eastern time. The expected inflation rate is the median
forecast of the year-over-year inﬂation rate from the Money Market Services International
(MMSI) survey. MMSI surveys approximately X participants in Canadian financial
markets each week for their forecasts of economic data to be released imminently. The
inflation surprise is defined as the expected value minus the actual value. The exchange
37.The response of short-term interest rate differentials is not a good indicator of monetary policy credibility
because, a priori, these differentials are apt to widen in the face of an inﬂationary surprise irregardless of
whether monetary policy is credible. If the central bank is perceived as credible on inﬂation, domestic
short-term interest rates may rise as part of the tightening in monetary conditions required to resist the
inﬂation surprise. If monetary policy is not credible, and inﬂation is expected to be higher following the
CPI surprise, short-term interest rates may rise as a result of the Fisher effect.
38.Engle and Frankel (1984) and Deaves (1990), set out theoretical models based on Dornbusch (1976) that
give this result/ support this interpretation.34 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
rate response to the CPI announcement is defined as the change in the log of the bilateral
exchange rate (bid-ask average) from the close on the day preceeding the release to noon
of the day of the release. The response of international interest rate differentials ( 5-year
bonds and 10-year bonds) to the CPI announcement is defined as the change in the
differential from the close on the day preceeding the release to the close on the day of the
release.
Before turning to the estimation results, it is worth briefly discussing some of the
properties of the MMSI inflation survey. After all, the results of a study based on the
MMSI survey of expectations will be more “credible” if the surveyed expectations have
desirable properties -- are rational. Tests reveal that the MMSI survey data for expected
inflation are an unbiased predictor of actual inflation (see Annex 1). The MMSI forecasts
of inflation are inefficient, however. Forecast accuracy could be improved, if the markets
were to take account of information, such as recent changes in exchange rates and the
unemployment rate, already known at the time the forecast is made.
6.2.2  The Estimation Results
For Test1, the results are supportive of monetary policy crediblity. The coefficient
on the inflation surprise term is positive -- although small with a 10 % inflation surprise
leading to a ... % appreciation of the exchange rate -- and is signiﬁcant at the 5 % level for
a one-tailed test.39 There is no evidence of autocorrelation. The F-statistic for the equation
as a whole is significant and the equation explains 17% of the daily movement in the
exchange rate. Most of the explanatory power of the equation derives from the change in
aggregate commodity prices, measured in U.S. dollars, on the day of the CPI
announcement. Commodity prices are included in the regression because they are one of
the factors known to inﬂuence the Canadian dollar and are observable daily.40
39.We are only concerned with whether the coefﬁcient is positive or not.
40.Many papers have investigated the response of the exchange rate to economic news in the United States
(see, for example, Edwards (1982,1983), Hardouvelis (1984, 1985, 1988), Engle and Frankel (1984),
Hakkio and Pearce (1985)). A common ﬁnding is that larger-than-expected money supply
announcements induce an appreciation of the domestic currency rather than the depreciation a simple
monetary model of the exchange rate would predict. Engle and Frankel (1984) attribute the negative
correlation between exchange rate changes and monetary innovations to the transitory nature of the
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While the above results are encouraging, further investigation is required before
strong statements can be made on this basis about the credibility of current monetary
policy in Canada. In particular, there is a possibility that the regression results might
falsely attribute the effect of other events happening at the same time to the CPI surprise.
We have tried to control for this potential problem in a number of ways including, keeping
the observation window on the dependent variable as narrow as possible, incorporating the
change in commodity prices on the announcement day (other than interest rates this is the
only variable that might prove an important determinant of the Canadian exchange rate
that is observed daily) and using dummy variables to test the influence of events, such as
treasury bill auctions, known to have occurred on the day of a CPI release.
In addition, to check whether there might be particular observations that are
significantly affecting the results, we have done a scatter plot of the change in the
exchange rate against the inﬂation surprise. Three of the obsevations might be considered
outliers -- 21 January 1992, 19 March 1993, and 20 October 1995. We have investigated
these dates and have found that on two of them retail sales data for Canada were also
released.Unfortuneately we do not have the retail sales forecasts needed to construct
surprise values for these data releases, so we are unable to take into account the possible
interactions between these surprises and the CPI surprises on those dates. For example, we
do not know whether the two types of surprises were mutually reinforcing in terms of their
implications for potential inflationary pressures, or offsetting. This undoubtedly would
make a difference for the estimation results. However, absent such information we re-
estimated the above equation including a dummy variable for these two dates. The results
suggest potential fragility in our estimates -- the dummy variable is highly statistically
significant, the parameter on the inflation surprise becomes statistically insignificant and
there is evidence of higher order autocorrelation in the regression residuals. This is a
matter that warrants further study.
Before discussing the results for Test2, it is worth mentionning briefly the results
of a few variants of Test1 that we tried. We also tested whether the state of the economy,
the sign of the surprise and the position of the inflation rate relative to the target range
were important factors in explaining the response of the exchange rate to the CPI
announcement. None of these factors were statistically signiﬁcant. Admittedly, however, it
is difﬁcult to discern the possible inﬂuence of the state of the economy, as measured by the36 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
unemployment gap, with this sample period because the economy was in excess supply
for most of the time. The asset market view may explain the lack of explanatory power of
the actual inflation rate relative to the target range -- the expected position of inflation
relative to the target range is already discounted in the exchange rate prior to the release of
the data, therefore the CPI surprise may be the best overall summary measure of the
surprise.
We also estimated the same regression using an inflation surprise based on the
MMSI survey for the CPI excluding food and energy, a construct very close to the Bank of
Canada’s operational inflation target (which excludes indirect taxes as well). The
coefficient on the inflation surprise was positive, but it was statistically insignificant, and
the overall equation ﬁt the data much less well than the equation incorporating the surprise
for the total CPI.
For Test2, the results also suggest that recent Canadian monetary policy has been
credible. For interest rate differentials at both 5- and 10-year maturities there is no
statistically signiﬁcant relationship with the inﬂation surprise variable (Table ?)41.
6.2.3  A Simple Corroborative Test
In this subsection, we conduct a simple corroborative test of the credibility of
Canada’s inﬂation targets in the spirit of Svenson (1994). When a central bank announces
a target range or zone for inﬂation, there are a number of simple tests one can construct of
whether the inflation target is credible -- of whether market participants believe that
inflation in the future will fall within the target range. When survey data on the inflation
expectations of market participants are available, the easiest test of the credibility of the
inflation target is to compare the inflation expectations with the maximum and minimum
inflation rates of the target range. If inflation expectations fall within the target range, the
targets are credible. footnote: Svensson developes similar tests with nominal interest rates
and the forward exchange rates as well.
41.Several studies have found U.S. interest rates to be sensitive to inﬂation and money stock announcements.
Smirlock (1986), using interest rate data from 1979 to 1983, found that a 1 percent CPI surprise raised
20-year Treasury bond yields by 9 basis points, while Hardouvelis (1988) , using interest rates from 1979
to 1984, found that a 1 percent CPI surprise increased 20-year bond yields by 18 basis points. Goodhart
and Smith (1985), however, found that U.K. releases have no effect on daily changes in either short- or
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In chart ?, two types of inﬂation expectations are plotted against the inﬂation target
range for Canada; the expectations for the current month of financial market participants
surveyed by MMSI, and longer-term expectations of a group of economic forecasters and
financial market participants surveyed semi-annually (on this question) by Consensus
Economics Inc. To get a sense of the evolution of the latter expectations since the inﬂation
targets have been implemented, we plot the results of the survey in April 1991 and the
survey in April 1996. The MMSI survey expectations track actual inflation closely and,
therefore, for a considerable portion of the period since the beginning of 1992 are below
the lower band of the inflation target range. This suggests that the inflation target was not
credible, at least on a very short-term basis, but this result is not surprising. If actual
inflation was below the lower band in the preceeding month, the inertia in the inflation
process is such that it is extremely difficult for a central bank to achieve the target in the
current month (absent a “favourable” shock) and market participants realize this.
In this regard, the evolution of the Consensus Economics Inc. long-term inflation
forecast, which are a more forward-looking measure of inflation expectations, might be a
better Svennson-test of credibility. These surveys indicate a gain in credibility of monetary
policy since 1991. The 1991 survey showed expected inflation slightly above the target
range from 1995 through 2001; while the latest long-term expectation is exactly at the
mid-point of the current target range, suggesting that the inﬂation target is now credible42.
6.3  Have market perceptions of monetary policy changed through time?
[This subsection will be redrafted somewhat and placed at the beginning of this
section.]
In addition to knowing whether current Bank of Canada monetary policy is
credible with markets, it would be of interest to know whether market’s perceptions of
monetary policy have changed through time. Unfortuneately, as we mentionned earlier,
the required survey data on inflation expectations do not exist for earlier periods.
Therefore to examine the credibility of Canadian monetary policy over a longer time
horizon we estimate a Var to predict inﬂation, and, hence, to derive inﬂation surprises.
42.At the time of the April 1991 survey the last speciﬁed numerical target was for 1995 with a lower long-
term target to be elaborated. In December 1993 the band was extended through 1998.38 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
The VAR estimated to predict inﬂation (and therefore inﬂation surprises) builds on
the VAR developed to search for changes in monetary policy behaviour in Canada in the
previous subsection of the paper. The current Var has two main differences from the earlier
VAR. First, it uses the total CPI rather than the core CPI as the measure of inflation
because the total CPI worked best for MMSI data. And, second, it includes commodity
prices as an indicator of supply/price shocks. As such this VAR comprises the main
ingredients a market participant might consider in formulating a forecast for inflation --
the monetary policy rule of the central bank, a measure of the inflation rate, the
unemployment gap which encapsulates the business cycle movements of the real
macroeconomy, and a measure/indicator of supply shocks.
The VAR is estimated using OLS. As with the previous VAR, we roll the sample
period in five-year intervals because there is reason to think that Bank of Canada
behaviour changed in the 1980s, so the earlier data would become less useful in predicting
inflation. We chose the order of the VAR according to the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn
criteria. Finally the results for the VARs seem to be reasonably robust to sample size -- a
ten-year rolling sample gives very similar results.
The distribution of the CPI surprises and the change in the exchange rate on CPI
release dates for the period 1975 to 1996 are described in chart? and the accompanying
table.
To test the market’s perception of monetary policy over this period, we estimate
the same equation relating the change in the exchange rate to the inﬂation surprise and the
change in commodity prices measured in U.S. dollars as in section 3.1.2. Unfortuneately
the results are not encouraging. The fit of the overall equation is poor and the coefficient
on the inﬂation surprise is statistically insigniﬁcant (Table?). It seems unlikely in principle
that these factors would not have been of some concern to foreign exchange markets
during this period, so it is probable that the inflation forecasts generated by the VAR are
not an adequate representation of the inﬂation expectations of market particpants
7. Conclusions
Credibility -- precisely what it is, how to get it and how to keep it -- is a
complicated subject, and there is still much to learn. Nevertheless, economists haveThe credibility of monetary policy: 39
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learned a considerable amount already and these lessons are increasingly being applied by
policymakers, especially central bankers. For example, the Treaty of Maastricht requires
countries participating in the EMU to grant their central banks operational independence;
at the present time, at least seven countries have explicit inflation targets and many more
have announced numerical objectives for inflation (often in conjunction with other
objectives such as intermediate targets for the exchange rate); and, at least, one country,
New Zealand, has introduced a contract for the Governor of its central bank along the lines
analyzed by Walsh (1995) and others.
For its part, Canada has implemented many of the lessons from the “credibility”
literature. Beginning with efforts to build a good reputation by matching rhetoric with
actions, and continuing with a series of initiatives intended to render monetary policy
more transparent and predictable and the monetary authorities more accountable, the Bank
of Canada has endevoured to make its policy more credible. A number of simple tests
suggest that these efforts have been fruitful, that Canada’s targets for controlling inflation
are credible with ﬁnancial market participants. However, these tests are best viewed as an
early effort in assessing the credibility of recent Canadian monetary policy; more
experience with the inflation targets and further study are required before strong
statements can be made about the credibility of the policy. Also, one should not become
complacent -- it is unlikely that a universal panacea for the time-inconsitency problem will
ever be found; nature is such that the conduct of monetary policy will probably always be
a challenge.
Annex 1: Some Properties of the MMSI Survey of Expected Inﬂation
One of the key tests for rationality of survey expectations data is unbiasedness. The
expectation should be an unbiased predictor of the variable. This property can be tested by
an OLS regression of the form:
Unbiasedness implies an intercept equal to zero and a slope coefﬁcient of unity. A
regression of the MMSI forecast of inflation on the actual inflation rate has these
properties, an intercept that is insignificantly different statistically from zero and a slope40 Robert Amano and Simon van Norden
coefficent that is not statistically significantly different from one. The MMSI survey of
inﬂation expectations is an unbiased predictor of actual inﬂation.
Another common test of the rationality of survey data is a test for efficiency or
forecast error unpredictability. The forecast error, defined as the difference between the
suvey expectation and the realization of the variable, should not be correlated with any
information available at the time the forecast was made. Unfortunealy, the MMSI survey
data for inflation expectations do not pass this test. Some simple regressions suggest that
there is information in lagged unemployment gaps and lagged changes in the exchange
rate that would reduce the size of CPI surprises.
Finally, the distributions of the inflation surprise (forecast error) and of the four
variables it will be used to explain (the change in: the exchange rate, the commercial paper
differential, the 5-year bond yield differential, and the 10-year bond yield differential) are
described in tables x through y with the associated graphs. Generally speaking the
variables have similar distributions and there is no reason to think that a simple linear
regression is inappropriate.
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